Abstract. We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual decisiveness in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. These individual measures, which we call weighted semivalues, form a class whose intersection with that of the class of weak semivalues yields the class of all semivalues.
Introduction
Many authors have discussed the value theory of cooperative TU-games and its counterpart for simple games, the theory of power measures. The material in the present paper arises from a generalization of a particular measure of manipulability of voting rules (below called Q) circulated in preprint form by the present authors. We realized that our original arguments generalize greatly, and yield a general construction for TU-games that leads directly to a large class of allocations including all semivalues. Amongst these, the simplest one yields a semivalue with several attractive properties.
1.1. Our contribution. We explore the (Shapley-Shubik) sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game, and define (Section 3 and 4) a family of decisiveness measures Q * F and individual power measures q * F for simple games. These measures satisfy many desirable properties, and extend naturally to the class of TU-games. It turns out that this construction generates the class of what we call weighted semivalues. We give several interpretations of these values in Section 5. In this framework the simplest F is affine and yields a weighted semivalue we call q * 0 , which we single out for further attention. Although it differs substantially from the Shapley-Shubik index, it is closely related as we see in Section 5.3. We illustrate the new measures by applying them to some well-known games, including games derived from the study of strategic manipulation of voting rules, our original motivating examples.
Remark. An allocation is often called a value assignment or simply value. An additive game is completely specified by the value of v on singletons, so an allocation is just a way of associating a nonnegative real number with each player (we prefer not to use a vector, in order to avoid choosing an arbitrary ordering on players).
A simple game [10] G = (X, W ) on a finite set X is defined by a collection W of subsets of X (called winning coalitions), such that ∅ ∈ W . Equivalently, it is a TU-game on X where v takes only the values 0 and 1 (the value 1 corresponding to the property "winning", whilst coalitions with value 0 are called losing). Note that we do not require that the game be nonempty -that is, we may have W = ∅. The class of all simple games on X is denoted SG(X) and we define SG analogously to G. A special class of game is the (weak) unanimity game U S defined by S, where a coalition is winning if and only if it contains S. When |S| = 1 this is called a dictatorial game.
The random query process
Let G = (X, W ) ∈ SG. Consider the following stochastic process. We choose elements of X sequentially without repetition, at each step choosing uniformly from the set of elements not yet chosen, until the set of elements seen so far first becomes a winning coalition. This is the same process considered by Shapley and Shubik [9] in defining their power index (see Section 5.2 for more details).
We first consider the random variable equal to the number of queries required. 2.1. Non-sequential interpretation. The sequential nature of the process is only apparent, once we have averaged over all possible orders. Thus we ought to be able to find a representation of Q(G) that does not mention order of players. In order to do this, we assume from now on that the game is monotone.
Definition 2.3. For each natural number k, define the probability measure m k to be the uniform measure on the set of all subsets of X of size k. Thus each subset of X of size k is equally likely to be chosen, with probability
For each natural number k, we let W k (respectively, L k ) denote the set of all winning (respectively, losing) coalitions of size k.
where the latter probability is with respect to m k .
In other words, the probability that we require at most k queries to find a winning coalition equals the probability that a randomly chosen k-subset is a winning coalition.
Proof. The event Q(G) ≤ k means precisely that the initial subset A(Q(G), k) formed by the first k queries contains a winning subset. Each subset of X of size k occurs with equal probability n k −1 as an initial subset of queries of the query sequence, so that A(Q(G), k) is distributed as a uniform random sample from X k .
Remark. The cumulative distribution function of Q(G) can thus be computed by simply counting the number of winning coalitions of each fixed size.
We can now derive a simple explicit formula for Q(G).
Lemma 2.5.
Proof. For every π, Q π (G) is at most n + 1. If G is empty then W k is empty for all k and Q(G) = n + 1, as expected. Otherwise, W n has a single element and Q π (G) is at most n. Thus by Lemma 2.4 we have
Remark. Note that the summation can start at k = 1 because the game is nontrivial. If we allowed trivial games, then the value of the formula for Q(G) would be 0, which agrees with intuition.
Changes of variable and collective measures
The number of random queries made in order to find a winning coalition seems to us to be a fundamental quantity of a simple game. The quantity Q(G) intuitively seems to be a measure of inertia or resistance (as discussed in [4] ): its value is large if winning coalitions are scarce, and small if they are plentiful. The rescaled quantity 1 − Q(G)/(n + 1) looks like an index of what has been called complaisance [4, 7] and decisiveness [2] . We consider far more general rescalings of Q(G), with interesting consequences as will be seen below. 
(ii) F (n, 0) = 1 and F (n, k) = 0 whenever k > n. We say that F is an admissible rescaling.
Remark. We do not require that F be decreasing in n for each fixed k.
We shall see below that there is a direct relationship between F and the function f obtained as follows.
Lemma 3.2.
There is a bijection F ↔ f given by
Note that F is admissible if and only if f is nonnegative and
There is a bijection F ↔ µ given by
Note that F is admissible if and only if for each n, µ(n, ·) is a probability measure on {0, . . . , n}.
Remark. We shall often write µ n (k) for µ(n, k).
We now define our candidate for a measure of decisiveness.
where the expectation is taken with respect to the uniform distribution on permutations of X as in Definition 2.2.
where f and F are linked as in (1) .
Proof. Let f be as given in (1). Then
Now (1) and the standing assumptions on F imply that Q * F takes values between 0 and 1 and these values are attained. Hence Q * F is a decisiveness index on SG according to the definition in [11] .
Example 3.5. Choosing f (n, k) = 2 −n yields the Coleman index [?] . In this case µ n is the binomial distribution with parameter 1/2, and
which equals the probability that a uniformly randomly chosen subset has size at least k.
Example 3.6. The simplest functional form of the construction above occurs when F (n, k) = 1 − k/(n + 1), in which case µ n is the uniform distribution and
There is a close connection between power and decisiveness measures for simple games and value theory of TU-games [11] . In view of that connection, it is natural to generalize to TU-games.
We usually denote Q * F (G) simply by Q * F when no confusion is likely. This extended definition of Q * F yields a very general object, called a collective value in [11] . 3.1. The self-dual case. We can derive some special formulae for Q * F in important special cases. We recall that the dual of a TU-game
In the case of simple games, winning coalitions become losing, and vice versa, when passing to the dual. A game is self-dual if v * (S) = v(S) for all S.
Proposition 3.8. Let G = (X, v) ∈ G and suppose that F satisfies the identity Proof. Let I = q * F satisfy the stated condition and let G be a self-dual game. Then
The result follows by solving for I(G).
In the case of simple games we can say a little more. Recall that a simple game is proper if the complement of each winning coalition is losing, and strong if the complement of every losing coalition is winning.
Proposition 3.9. Let G = (N, W ) be a simple game and suppose that F satisfies the identity (3) .
Proof. For each k we define four types of subset: D k (respectively C k ) consists of those which are winning, and whose complement is not (respectively is), whereas Q k (respectively P k ) consists of those which are losing, and whose complement is not (respectively is). Complementation yields a map from G to G * such that
as in the proof of the previous proposition, and
G is proper if and only if C k = 0 for all k, while G is strong if and only if Q k = 0 for all k (a simple game is proper and strong if and only if it is self-dual). The results follow by solving for Q * F (G). Example 3.10. Next, we consider the unweighted qualified majority voting game. The winning coalitions are precisely those of size at least k 0 , for some fixed k 0 (depending on n). The value of Q * F on such a game equals
. Thus if n is odd and k 0 = (n + 1)/2 (the straight majority game), Q * F has value F (n, (n + 1)/2. If furthermore F satisfies the symmetry condition (3), then direct computation shows that Q * F takes the value 1/2. This is to be expected, since the game in question is proper and strong.
Individual measures
In this section we discuss properties of the marginal function of Q * F , which we denote q *
. We first review some properties of semivalues and generalizations.
4.1. Semivalues and related concepts. Several classes of allocations have been discussed in the literature. They can be given by axiomatic characterizations, but explicit formulae are more useful for our purposes. A weighted weak semivalue on X is an allocation on X that has the form
where p(S) ≥ 0. A weak semivalue on X is a weighted weak semivalue for which S:i∈S p(S) = 1 for each i ∈ X.
Remark. The above concepts were introduced in [1] 
where f (n, k) ≥ 0 for all n, k. A semivalue on X is a weighted semivalue on X that in addition satisfies the normalization condition
Remark. The definitions have the unfortunate consequence that a semivalue is a weighted weak semivalue that is both a weak semivalue and a weighted semivalue! The term weighted semivalue is formally used in the present paper for the first time, to our knowledge.
In [3] it was proven that semivalues are precisely the allocations satisfying the standard axioms Linearity, Positivity, Projection and Anonymity. The last says that if π : X → X is a permutation, then ψ(πi) = πψ(i) for each i ∈ X. Note that because of Anonymity, we may assume that X = X n := {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n = |X|. Let G denote the union n G(X n ). A semivalue on G is a function that for each n restricts to a semivalue on X n . In [3] it was shown that in addition to the explicit form (5), the recursion
is necessary and sufficient for such an extension.
The particular weighted semivalue we have in mind is the marginal function of Q * . We first show that rescaling is needed in all but the most trivial cases. Proposition 4.3. Let F be an admissible rescaling, let f be related to F as in Lemma 3.2 and let ψ be defined as in (4) . Then (i) ψ gives a weighted semivalue on X n for each n.
(ii) Let c n = n k=1
Proof. Note that ψ gives a weighted semivalue on G n because F is admissible, hence f (n, k) ≥ 0 for all n, k. Dividing by c n ensures that the normalization condition (5) is satisfied. Finally, suppose that c n = 1 and let a nk = n k f (n, k). By admissibility, a nk ≥ 0 and k a nk = 1. By hypothesis, 1 = c n = k k n a nk . Subtracting these two equalities yields the result. 4.2. The marginal function of Q * F . The marginal function of a decisiveness index is often interpreted as a power index (the analogue for TU-games is the relationship between a potential and an allocation [11, ?] ). We now explore this direction. 
Here F and f are related as in Lemma 3.2 
. (ii) Let
Then the normalized quantity q * F /c n is a semivalue on X n for each n. (iii) q * F is a weighted semivalue on G if and only if F satisfies the recursion identity
If, furthermore, c n is independent of n, then the normalized quantity q * F /c n is a semivalue on G, given by
Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 4.3 because q * F has exactly the form stated. The other results follow from the basic characterization of semivalues, translating the formulae for f into those for F . The coherence recursion (6) translates into
Note that c n is precisely the value Q * F (U {1} ) of Q * F on the dictatorial game with n players. The result now follows by algebraic simplification.
The construction above is in fact universal.
Proposition 4.5.
There is a bijection between probability measures on {0, 1, . . . , n} and weighted semivalues on G n given by µ n ↔ q * F . Proof. From Proposition 4.4, q * F is a weighted semivalue. Conversely, given a weighted semivalue ξ we define µ n (k) = f (n, k) := f (n, k)/c n where c n := k f (n, k) n k . Then defining F by (1) applied to f we have q * F = ξ.
Remark. Note that a weighted semivalue satisfies the normalization condition for a semivalue if and only if for each n, the mean of µ n is exactly n.
The recursion (6) translates to 
Example 4.6. For the Coleman index, the marginal function is given by
It is the semivalue associated to q * F where F (n, 0) = 1 and for k ≥ 1
where H n denotes as usual the nth harmonic number.
We single out the simplest case for special mention. Recall that a regular semivalue is one for which the weights f (n, k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n are all nonzero. Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 3.9, because F (n, k) = 1 − k/(n + 1) satisfies the identity (3) and so q * 0 is self-dual.
Interpretation of the measures
The collective value Q * F can be easily interpreted as a decisiveness index on simple games, which gives the probability of finding a winning coalition when coalitions are sampled first by choosing size according to µ n and then choosing a coalition of that size uniformly at random. The individual value q * F can be interpreted in the usual way (not without controversy) as a power index [11] . In this section we consider some other interpretations.
Coalition formation.
Consider the following model of coalition formation [5] . We assume that each possible coalition (subset S of X) forms with probability p(S), and that only one coalition S will form. Consider the following two expectations. First, the ex ante expected marginal contribution of i to S is
The ex interim expected marginal contribution of i to S, conditional on i ∈ S, is
Then [5, Proposition 3] the maps Φ i (·, p) are in bijection with the set of all probability distributions on 2 X . Furthermore the map corresponding to p is precisely the weighted weak semivalue given by
T :i∈T p(T )
Note that Φ is a weak semivalue if and only if T :i∈T p(T ) does not depend on i, and a semivalue if and only, if in addition, p(S) depends only on |S|. Thus for weak semivalues, the ex ante and ex interim marginal contribution of i to S is the same.
We now apply the above framework to our measures q * F . Proposition 5.1. Let F be an admissible rescaling. Then under the coalition formation model above, q * F,i gives the ex ante expected contribution of i to S, while the associated semivalue gives the ex interim expected marginal contribution of i to S, conditional on i ∈ S. [5, Proposition 2] , where essentially the same formula was derived.
Remark. The special case of the Shapley value was discussed in

Sequential interpretation.
The Shapley value σ can be defined sequentially as follows. Given a game G = (X, v), follow the query process and at each step award v(S) − v(S \ {i}) to i, where S is the set of elements queried so far and i is the last element queried. The expected value with respect to the uniform distribution on permutations of X is the Shapley value σ i (G). For simple games, this means that we award 1 point to i whenever i is pivotal, and 0 otherwise.
We can generalize this interpretation to measures of the form q * F . We follow the query process, and award kµ n (k) to the pivotal element if the process stops at k queries. For example, for q * 0 this means awarding k/(n + 1), the fraction of the maximum possible number of queries made (a possible interpretation is that we offer a higher price to pivotal elements to reveal themselves as we repeatedly fail to find them) . This corresponds to the nonsequential formula for q * F using the analogous computation to that for the Shapley value above. 5.3. Another model of semivalues. The standard model of simple game requires that the empty coalition never be winning (this is a consequence of the standard assumption that v(∅) = 0 for all TU-games). For reasons of mathematical elegance, at least, we prefer that the class of simple games be closed under duality. This then requires that the grand coalition is always winning, which is a reasonable assumption for weighted voting games. However for many applications, such as to the study of manipulation, empty games naturally arise. Thus, by duality, we should admit trivial games to the class of simple games. This approach is followed, for example, by Taylor and Zwicker [10] .
We denote by SG + (X) the class of simple games in this extended sense. The analogue for TU-games we denote G + (X).
In this new model, the axiomatic definition of semivalue remains the same, since the efficiency, anonymity, positivity and projection axioms still make sense. However the characterization of [3] changes slightly.
Proposition 5.2. A function ψ is a semivalue on G + (X) if and only if it has the form
where f (n, k) ≥ 0 and f satisfies the identity
Such a function extends to a semivalue on G + if and only if f also satisfies the identity
Proof. The proof of [3] still works, with the only change being that the normalization condition is slightly different. This is because the vector space of all games now includes the empty game in the standard basis of unanimity games and so has dimension one more than before. We recall that Q * 0 (G) is the probability that a randomly sampled coalition is winning, when a coalition size is chosen uniformly and condition on that a particular coalition is chosen. Alternatively, it gives the expected fraction of the maximum possible number of queries saved when players are sampled uniformly at random without replacement until a winning coalition has been found. The next type of example was our original motivation for the study of Q * 0 . The quantity Q seems to us a compelling way to measure the effort taken by an external agent to change the outcome of the election via manipulation. Assuming that the voting situation is known but not the complete profile (we may know from polling data how many voters of each type there are, but not their identity), the agent incurs a unit cost to determine each voter's type. The sequential model occurs naturally here. [6] present a model of bargaining intended to help give a noncooperative foundation to the theory of power indices and values. They discuss a setup where a proposer suggests an initial allocation of payoffs to a winning coalition containing the proposer. Let p be a map that for each set X of players, takes each simple game on X to a probability distribution over X × 2 X . The idea is that p G (i, S) is the probability that i will be the proposer with the support of S. They impose a dummy axiom which leads to the condition that p G (i, S) = 0 unless i swings S. Anonymity is also a reasonable assumption.
They discuss nonsequential ("first choose S, then i") and sequential ("choose i and S simultaneously") approaches. In the former case, given a probability distribution over coalitions where the probability of S depends only on |S|, in the first round we choose S and then choose choosing i ∈ S uniformly at random. If i swings S, then i is the proposer, otherwise we repeat rounds until a proposer is found). Thus we are in the arena of weighted semivalues and we write p(n, s) for p(S) when |X| = n. Proposition 6.3. Let F be admissible and consider the nonsequential protocol above, where S is chosen according to the probability given by µ F . Let π i be the probability that i is eventually chosen as the proposer, and let r i be the probability that i is chosen as proposer in the first step. Then there is c so that π i = cr i for all i.
In particular, for F = F 0 , π i equals the Shapley-Shubik index of i.
Proof. Let r i denote the probability that i is chosen as proposer in the first step. Then π i = r i / i r i . Now [6, p. 124 ].
Remark. This result was stated (in other words) without proof in
In the sequential scenario, the query process seems a very natural one. If the pivotal voter is always chosen as the proposer, then the probability of being the proposer is again the Shapley-Shubik index. However other choices are possible. For example, for each admissible F , if we weight the pivotal voter by kµ n (k) every time it is pivotal in position k, and then compute the overall probability accordingly, we obtain the normalized version of q * F .
